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The international transmission of monetary policy: 
Korea’s experience 
Jun Il Kim1 
Abstract 
Monetary policy shifts in advanced economies are transmitted to emerging market 
economies (EMEs) through monetary policy responses by EME central banks and 
changes in cross-border capital flows. The ripple effects, however, depend upon the 
EMEs’ macroeconomic fundamentals and the amount and composition of the 
portfolio investment funds that have already flowed into them. Since the 2008 
global financial crisis, Korea, like other EMEs, has been influenced, directly and 
indirectly, by the quantitative easing (QE) and quantitative easing tapering (QET) of 
major advanced economies. This paper discusses the international transmission 
effects occurring during the transformation to QE and QET, the related monetary 
policy responses and the challenges ahead, with a focus mainly on Korea’s 
experience. 
Keywords: Financial spillovers, capital flows, long-term interest rates, monetary 
policy challenges 
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Monetary policy shifts in advanced economies have been transmitted to emerging 
market economies (EMEs) via two channels: monetary policy responses by EME 
central banks, and cross-border capital flows. In the early phase of the global 
financial crisis, EME central banks, including the Bank of Korea (BOK), lowered their 
policy rates to counter the sharp economic contraction and the collapse of 
international trade flows. Such policy responses were affordable in part because of 
the significant policy space created by major central banks’ drastic cuts in policy 
rates to near zero; as a result, EME central banks were able to lower their own policy 
rates while maintaining adequate interest rate differentials vis-à-vis advanced 
economies. Although many EMEs experienced significant capital outflows 
immediately after the outbreak of the crisis, this would have occurred even if EME 
policy rates had not been reduced.  
Faced with the so-called zero lower bound, major central banks deployed 
unconventional monetary policies that combined forward guidance on their future 
monetary policy stances with balance sheet operations. These included the large-
scale asset purchases by the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) and the long-term 
financing operation of the ECB. The increased global liquidity under these policies 
helped to contain systemic risks and boost investors’ appetite for risk, while at the 
same time flowing into emerging markets in the search for yield. Large EMEs whose 
macrofinancial fundamentals were relatively strong received significant capital 
inflows and experienced currency appreciation. As many global banks in advanced 
economies were forced to deleverage, the bulk of capital flows to EMEs was in the 
form of portfolio investments, which have been less volatile than banking flows. 
The financial spillovers from unconventional monetary policies differed across 
EMEs, however, depending upon their macrofinancial fundamentals and their policy 
responses. Some EMEs instituted capital controls to put the brakes on surges in 
capital inflows and the attendant currency appreciation, while others used 
macroprudential tools in conjunction with sterilised FX intervention. For some EMEs, 
where capital inflows were large and accompanied by currency appreciation, 
domestic credit expanded and asset prices enjoyed buoyancy; at the same time, 
their external positions worsened, with current account deficits rising. The global 
financial markets were taken by surprise when the Fed first hinted at its intention to 
taper off its asset purchases in May 2013. They reacted with substantial asset price 
corrections even before the tapering began. In both advanced and emerging market 
economies, stock prices fell while long-term interest rates rose. Some fragile EMEs 
were hit hard with sharply falling currency values and sudden capital outflows. The 
global financial markets, however, remained relatively calm when the tapering 
actually began in 2014, although these fragile EMEs continued to face high financial 
market volatility.  
Korea has weathered the global financial crisis and the subsequent debt crises 
in the euro area relatively well, thanks to its strong fundamentals and adequate 
policy responses. Nevertheless, it has also been affected by financial spillovers from 
unconventional monetary policies, and has faced challenges in its conduct of 
monetary and foreign exchange policies. In what follows, this note summarises 
Korea’s experience in addressing these spillovers and the associated challenges. 
  
BIS Papers No 78 217
 
 
Financial spillovers and co-movements in long-term interest 
rates 
Korea’s open and liberalised capital markets have been fertile ground for financial 
spillovers and synchronised asset price movements. As global liquidity abounds, 
mainly because of extraordinary monetary easing in advanced economies, as 
discussed above, international portfolio investment funds have continued to flow 
into EMEs. Korea’s long-term interest rates have consequently plummeted, and the 
yield curve has flattened since the commencement of the second round of 
quantitative easing (Figure 1). Moreover, through liquidity and portfolio effects, the 
co-movements in long-term interest rates between advanced and emerging market 
economies have in fact strengthened compared to the pre-crisis period, with 
significantly higher correlations (Figure 2).  
 
Yield curve Figure 1 
Source: Korea Securities Computing Corporation (KOSCOM). 
Long-term interest rates1 in advanced2 and emerging market economies3 Figure 2 
AEs = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging market economies. 
1  Ten-year treasury bond yields (three-year yields for Korea). 2  Average of the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France.    3  Average of Korea, India, South Africa, Turkey, Chinese Taipei and Thailand. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Korea is no exception in this regard. Over the past decade or so, long-term 
interest rates in Korea have trended broadly in parallel with those of the United 
States and other advanced economies, with even stronger co-movements since the 
global financial crisis (Figure 3). For instance, the correlation between 10-year 
treasury bond yields in Korea and the United States was 0.5 before the crisis, but 
has jumped to nearly 0.9 in the post-crisis period (Table 1).2 As a result, the Bank of 
Korea has often encountered difficulties in controlling financial conditions by 
changing its policy rate, as long-term rates have tended to be affected more by 
capital flows and external factors, such as the US monetary policy stance, than by 
domestic short-term rates. Empirical evidence also supports the growing influence 
of foreign factors on long-term rates. First, Granger causality test results show that 
the causality runs unilaterally from US long-term rates to domestic long-term rates, 
particularly during the post-crisis period (Table 2). Second, formal regression 
analysis suggests that, during the post-crisis period, US long-term rates have had a 
significant impact on long-term rates, while domestic and other factors have had 
less influence than in the pre-crisis period (Table 3).3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  The coefficients of correlation between the 10-year treasury bond yields of Korea and those of the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Japan were 0.4, 0.8 and –0.1 before the crisis, but have all risen to 
0.9 in the post-crisis period. 
3  The results are robust to various specification tests. The same results obtain, for instance, if five-
year or three-year treasury bond yields are used for the dependent variable, or if a lagged 
dependent variable is added as an explanatory variable.  
Long-term interest rates: Korea and the United States1 Figure 3 
1  Based on 10-year treasury bond yields.  
Sources: Bank of Korea; Federal Reserve; Bloomberg. 
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Correlation with US long-term interest rates1 Table 1 
 
Pre-crisis 
(Jan 2001–Dec 2008) 
Post-crisis 
(Jan 2009–Aug 2013) 
Korea 0.49 0.89 
India 0.47 –0.40 
Indonesia –0.282 0.74 
Mexico  0.053 0.87 
South Africa 0.27 0.82 
1  Based on 10-year treasury bond yields.    2  From July 2003 to December 2008.    3  From August 2001 to December 2008.  
Sources: Bank of Korea; Federal Reserve; Bloomberg. 
 
Results of Granger causality test (F-statistics)1 Table 2 
Null hypothesis 
Pre-crisis 
(Jan 2001–Dec 2008) 
Post-crisis 
(Jan 2009–Nov 2013) 
Whole period 
(Jan 2001–Nov 2013) 
US interest rates  Korean interest rates 1.20 2.18* 3.28** 
Korean interest rates  US interest rates 1.42 1.11 1.05 
The symbols * and ** indicate significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.  
1  Ten-year treasury bond yields; the lag is 4. 
Source: Bank of Korea staff calculations. 
 
Ordinary least squares estimation results: determinants of Korean long-term 
interest rates1, 2 Table 3 
 Pre-crisis 
(Jan 2004–Dec 2008) 
Post-crisis 
(Jan 2009–Oct 2013) 
Whole period 
(Jan 2004–Oct 2013) 
Constant term 0.504 
(2.613) 
8.371*** 
(1.777) 
3.126** 
(1.406) 
Expectations for base rate (R)3 0.459*** 
(0.082) 
0.265** 
(0.110) 
0.310*** 
(0.093) 
Inflationary expectations3 0.541* 
(0.320) 
–0.074 
(0.159) 
0.087 
(0.186) 
Composite leading indicators year-on-
year  
0.076* 
(0.041) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
Real effective exchange rate of Korean 
won 
0.001 
(0.013) 
–0.074*** 
(0.016) 
–0.027** 
(0.011) 
US 10-year Treasury bond yields 0.056 
(0.098) 
0.909*** 
(0.065) 
0.760*** 
(0.100) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
 N = 60 
Adj R2 = 0.57 
N = 58 
Adj R2 = 0.92 
N = 118 
Adj R2 = 0.81 
The symbols *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
1  Dependent variable: Korean 10-year treasury bond yields.    2  Figures in brackets are heteroscedasticity and autorcorrelation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors.    3  Public survey data.  
Source: Bank of Korea staff calculations. 
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There are two related effects that appear to explain the strengthened impact of 
US interest rates on domestic long-term interest rates during the post-crisis period. 
First, the increased portfolio investment inflows have pushed long-term rates down 
through liquidity effects. Foreign investors’ holdings of domestic bonds, which 
stood at only 5 trillion won at the end of 2006, have increased rapidly since 2008 to 
surpass 100 trillion won by mid-2013, with the bulk of this concentrated in treasury 
bonds and monetary stabilisation bonds issued by the BOK. As a consequence, the 
foreign share of treasury bond holdings had risen from a mere 3 per cent in early 
2007 to 18 per cent by the end of 2011 (Figure 4). Second, the debt maturity 
structure has changed in favour of yield curve flattening. Faced with large capital 
inflows driven by abundant global liquidity, the authorities have not only deployed 
macroprudential tools, but have also undertaken sterilised interventions when the 
FX market volatility increased significantly. In this process, the BOK has mopped up 
the liquidity by issuing monetary stabilisation bonds with maturities of up to two 
years, ceteris paribus creating upward pressure on short-term interest rates. As 
foreign portfolio investment has been concentrated in treasury bonds with 
maturities of three years or longer, however, long-term interest rates have been 
subject to downward pressure, resulting in a flattened yield curve. 
Since May 2013, when the Fed hinted at its intention to taper off its large-scale 
asset purchases, a second round of financial spillovers has been felt by many EMEs, 
but in the opposite direction. In May and June 2013, when the global financial 
market strains were at their (local) peak, all Asian EMEs experienced stock price 
declines, steep rises in interest rates and currency depreciations. The markets soon 
began to differentiate among EMEs on the basis of their fundamentals, however, 
and Korea has benefited from such differentiated reactions (Figure 5). Differentiated 
market reactions have been observed in terms of capital flows as well. Korea had in 
the past exhibited higher capital flow volatility than the EME average, perhaps 
owing to its open and liquid capital markets. Unlike many other EMEs, however, 
Korea witnessed relatively stable capital flows during the second half of 2013. For 
example, while many other EMEs were experiencing capital outflows, there were 
notable inflows of portfolio investment funds to Korea in this period (Figure 6). 
Given its strong external position and financial fundamentals, Korea has thus far 
managed the financial spillovers from the somewhat acute and volatile asset price 
corrections in the global financial markets relatively well. Although Korea has received 
Foreign investment in Korean bonds Figure 4 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
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large amounts of bond flows since the global financial crisis, the talk of tapering did 
not lead to any significant increase in long-term interest rates or in their volatility. 
Foreign investment in Korean debt securities in 2008–2012 totalled more than US$ 90 
billion, the third largest amount among EMEs after Brazil and Mexico. Between May 
and August 2013, however, yields on 10-year treasury bonds were, at their peak, only 
1 percentage point higher than their end-April level in Korea, while ranging from 2 to 
4 percentage points higher for other major EMEs in the G20 (Figure 7). The daily 
variation in market interest rates was likewise lower for Korea during this period 
(Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Financial market developments: selected Asian EMEs1, 2 Figure 5 
Common market reactions 
(22 May 2013–24 June 2013) 
Differentiated market reactions 
(25 June 2013–7 Jan 2014) 
 
AEs = advanced economies; G3 = Group of Three (the United States, Germany and Japan). 
1  Interest rates: 10-year treasury bond yields for the United States, Japan and Germany; three-year treasury bond yields for Asian EMEs.   
2  Exchange rates: a positive value indicates appreciation; the US Dollar Index was used for the US dollar. 
Sources: Bank of Korea staff calculations; Bloomberg. 
Portfolio investment in Asian EMEs1 Figure 6 
1  Average monthly volumes. 
Sources: Bank of Korea staff calculations; Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR). 
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Policy responses 
Given the ever growing cross-border financial linkages, the monetary policies of 
major advanced economies have provided important input to the BOK’s policy rate 
decisions, particularly since the capital account liberalisation in the late 1990s. At the 
same time, volatile global market conditions, fickle capital flows, and exchange rate 
volatility have all posed significant challenges to EME monetary policymaking, and 
the financial linkages have often constrained the monetary policy response to 
developments in domestic inflation and the business cycle. In 2011, for instance, 
Impact of tapering talk on long-term interest rates1 Figure 7 
1  Ten-year treasury bond yields compared to end-April 2013, based on record highs from May to August (1 May–2 July for Brazil). 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Volatility of long-term interest rates1  
(Variation coefficient) Figure 8 
1  Based on daily interest rates on 10-year treasury bond yields from May to August 2013 (1 May–2 July for Brazil).  
Source: Bloomberg. 
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when the BOK raised its policy rate to counter rising inflation pressures, long-term 
interest rates reacted little to this monetary tightening. 
In the early stage of the global financial crisis, the BOK deployed various non-
interest rate policies in efforts to stabilise the exchange and interest rates, including 
the purchase of treasury bonds and liquidity operations targeting a large array of 
financial institutions (Table 4). Such policies helped to restore the monetary policy 
transmission channel and to reduce counterparty risks in the interbank markets. The 
BOK also intervened in the foreign exchange markets to stabilise the exchange rate 
by auctioning off FX liquidity to both the interbank markets and the FX/currency 
swap markets. 
Use of non-interest rate policy instruments during the Lehman crisis  Table 4 
Policy goal 
Improving interest 
rate channels 
Improving conditions 
for issuance of bonds 
with credit risk 
Increasing banks’ 
lending capacities 
Increasing liquidity 
supply 
 
Policy instruments 
– Long-term 
repurchase operations 
to facilitate certificate 
of deposit and 
commercial paper 
market transactions 
– Treasury bond 
purchases 
– Adding bank 
debentures, etc, to 
securities eligible for 
open market 
operations 
 
 
– Supporting bond 
market stabilisation 
fund  
– Raising aggregate 
credit ceiling  
– Paying interest on 
reserves 
– Supporting 
recapitalisation funds 
– Increasing scope of 
lending collateral 
– Monetary 
stabilisation bond 
redemptions prior to 
maturity 
– Increasing scope of 
financial institutions 
eligible for open 
market operations 
– Easing reserve 
management 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
Macroprudential policy measures: Korea Figure 9 
Cap on banks’ FX derivatives positions 
(as a percentage of equity capital) 
Banks’ FX derivatives positions 
 
FBB = foreign bank branches. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
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Aside from keeping its macrofinancial fundamentals in sound condition, Korea 
empowered its monetary policy with macroprudential and credit policies during the 
later phase of the global financial crisis. As part of its FX-related macroprudential 
tools, leverage caps on the FX derivatives positions of banks and a bank levy on 
non-core FX liabilities were introduced in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and since 
then have been adjusted flexibly in line with market conditions. Although it may be 
premature to assess the effectiveness of these two measures, preliminary 
evaluation4 suggests that they have been effective in reducing the currency and 
maturity mismatches on bank balance sheets (Figures 9–10). To be specific, short-
term external debt as a share of total external debt and foreign reserves has fallen 
markedly over the past few years (Figure 11). 
 
 
4  Choi (2013). 
Currency and maturity mismatches of domestic banks Figure 10 
 
1  FX liabilities minus FX assets.    2  Short-term FX liabilities minus short-term FX assets. 
Source: Bank of Korea staff calculations. 
External debt: selected Asian EMEs Figure 11 
Ratio of short-term external debt to total external debt 
Ratio of short-term external debt to foreign exchange 
reserves 
 
1  For China, end-Q4 2008. 
Sources: Bank of Korea staff calculations; IMF, International Financial Statistics and Special Data Dissemination Standard. 
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Policy challenges 
From now on, the monetary policies of EMEs will continue to face challenges related 
to financial spillovers and the global transition to a “new normal”. The key 
challenges for Korea and other financially open EMEs can be summarised as follows.  
First, unsynchronised exits by major advanced economies from their 
extraordinary monetary easing would be likely to create exchange rate volatility 
among key reserve currencies, which would in turn have significant implications for 
international trade and investment. A continued and large depreciation of the 
Japanese yen could harm Korea’s competitiveness in global markets. Higher 
exchange rate volatility among the key currencies would add more uncertainty to 
the investment decisions of firms. Last, but by no means least, the financial 
spillovers from US monetary tightening – ie hikes in the federal fund rates – could 
be far more adverse than those resulting from tapering. Monetary policy would 
therefore need to be well calibrated in order to strike the right balance between 
financial stability and economic recovery.  
Second, EMEs operating under inflation targeting regimes may have to prepare 
for the risk of global secular stagnation and disinflation, if not deflation. Persistently 
lower global inflation will pass through to persistently lower domestic inflation. 
Under these circumstances, EME central banks may need to reconsider the 
suitability of their inflation targets. Similarly, the risk of secular stagnation would 
have profound implications for the natural rate of interest or the long-run 
equilibrium real interest rate. And even if the risk of secular stagnation is ruled out, 
there are good reasons to believe that the long-run equilibrium real interest rate 
will be at a lower level than in the past, eg owing to changes in prudential 
regulations and financial market infrastructure. If so, returning to the pre-crisis norm 
would be unduly contractionary.  
Third, EME central banks may be forced to expand the scope of their monetary 
policies, thus risking their independence. Since the crisis, central bank mandates 
have in fact been expanded in many countries to include financial stability and/or 
growth and employment. Moreover, unconventional monetary policies and forward 
guidance have been used to manage virtually the entire yield curve, rather than just 
its short end. While extraordinary circumstances (eg hitting the zero lower bound or 
impairment of the monetary transmission channels) may offer some justification for 
such yield curve management, the information content of asset prices can be 
distorted or degraded as a result. Nevertheless, EME central banks may go beyond 
adjusting their policy rates and opt to manage the longer end of the yield curve as 
part of their policy responses to financial spillovers.  
EME central banks may also be tempted to manage the yield curve because of 
the segmented corporate funding structure, whereby large firms fund mainly 
through capital markets, while small and medium-sized companies depend heavily 
on bank lending. In Korea, and perhaps many other Asian EMEs, short-term interest 
rates have accounted for an important part of monetary policy transmission to the 
real economy through their impact on bank lending rates. A large portion of the 
bank lending that goes to small and medium-sized firms and households has been 
offered at variable interest rates, and also at relatively short maturities (of, say, one 
year or less). Indeed, bank lending rates have tended to move in closer alignment 
with short-term (three-month) than with long-term (10-year) treasury bond rates 
(Figure 12). Moreover, short-term debt makes up a large share of total corporate 
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debt (Figure 13).5 Long-term interest rates, in contrast, matter more for large firms, 
whose primary sources of funding are capital markets. In consequence, the entire 
yield curve would probably become significant for corporate funding and 
investment. 
 
Lastly, but no less importantly, FX reserve management would pose increasingly 
more complex challenges to EME central banks. Total FX reserves have risen 
continuously since the global financial crisis, reaching US$ 7.5 trillion in June 2013, 
compared to US$ 4.9 trillion at end-2008. This is partly a result of the policy efforts 
of EME central banks to mitigate the complications arising from the surges in capital 
inflows associated with the unconventional monetary policies undertaken in 
 
5  IMF (2011). 
Bank lending rates and market interest rates: correlations1 Figure 12 
Corporate lending rates Household lending rates 
 
1  Moving correlation coefficients over the preceding two years (24 months). 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
Short-term corporate debt 
As a percentage of total corporate debt Figure 13 
Source: IMF (2011). 
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advanced economies. On the central bank balance sheet, a large stockpile of FX 
reserves is typically matched by large domestic liabilities. This creates considerable 
currency mismatches and also causes great financial costs to central banks, given 
the positive domestic/overseas interest rate differentials. But large levels of FX 
reserves also bring financial benefits to the national economy as a whole, by 
offering greater financial stability and reducing the costs of external borrowing by 
the private sector. While the opportunity costs of holding large levels of FX reserves 
should therefore be compared to the financial stability benefits at the national level, 
central banks may assume most of these costs.  
Easier and more predictable access to the global financial safety nets would 
probably be a short-term solution that could benefit both emerging and advanced 
market economies. An ultimate long-run solution would be the internationalization 
of EME currencies so that EMEs can borrow from global markets in their own 
currencies. To that end, EME central banks can act collectively to increase the global 
demand for their currencies for trade and investment purposes. Along this line of 
argument, the BOK has been active in arranging bilateral local currency swap 
facilities with other EME central banks. Such swap arrangements can be used to 
support trade settlement in local currencies and to help reduce excessive 
dependence on the US dollar.  
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